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Sports ordinary negligence in the final furlong? 
The sport of horseracing in the United Kingdom has in recent years had to 
fight accusations of race fixing and bribery scandals. It has also had to deal 
with three of its major stars facing one another across the court room as one 
brought an action in negligence against two of his fellow professional jockeys 
who, he alleged, caused him severe injuries when he fell from his mount in a 
hurdles race.1 Although this was the first case of its kind in England and 
Wales, similar actions have been brought elsewhere in Australia and the 
United States, (under the jurisdiction of New York) and this provides the 
opportunity to examine the approach that is taken to sports participant 
negligence in each of the three jurisdictions. 
The cases all stemmed from similar incidents, however, the results were very 
different with New York applying a standard of reckless disregard, Australia 
applying a standard of ordinary negligence and England and Wales applying a 
standard of ordinary negligence, holding at the same time that the behaviour 
necessary to breach that standard was likely to amount to reckless disregard. 
This is consistent with the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Blake v 
Galloway,2  where it seems as if the standard of care advocated for children’s 
horseplay and recreational sports, (obiter), was returned quite clearly to that 
of reckless disregard which had first been put forward in Wooldridge v 
Sumner.3 
 
The United States and Australia 
In Turcotte v Fell,4 in New York, the alleged interference was caused by the 
defendant ‘s horse itself directly contacting the plaintiff’s horse, in turn causing 
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the plaintiff’s horse to move sideways, which then came into contact with 
another horse and as a result, fell, causing the jockey serious injury. Ronald 
Turcotte suffered paraplegia at a time when he was at the very height of his 
profession having won the prestigious “triple crown” (The Kentucky Derby, 
The Belmont Stakes and Preakness Stakes) on board Secretariat, arguably 
America’s greatest ever racehorse, three years previously. Originally the case 
was argued under ordinary negligence, (i.e. reasonable care). The Court ruled 
however that the proper standard to be applied was that of recklessness or 
intentional conduct. Lockman J. concluded that:5 
“By engaging in the activities of a professional 
thoroughbred jockey, plaintiff reasonably 
consented to expose himself to certain risks in 
return for potential and substantial rewards. In so 
doing he relieved the other jockeys, including 
defendant Fell, of any duty of care with respect to 
the known and apparent risks of horse racing, but 
he did not relieve them of their duty to refrain 
from reckless, wanton or intentional infliction 
of injury”. (Emphasis added) 
 
It was further held that, due to the dangers inherent in horse racing, that that 
duty did not extend to merely negligent conduct. This followed the reasoning 
from the cases Nabozny v Barnhill ,6 Ross v Clouser7 and many others. The 
plaintiff, (Turcotte) was unable to establish either recklessness or indeed even 
negligence against the defendant, and so his action failed.  
Johnston v Frazer,8 also involved flat horse-racing, in which the question 
surrounding the appropriate standard of care was central to the issues 
presented. The claimant suffered severe injuries and alleged that the 
defendant was negligent in allowing his mount Taksan to veer in whilst he 
lacked clear space to do so, and that this caused the catastrophic collision. 
The plaintiff argued further that the standard of care that should be applied 
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was that of ordinary negligence, as held in Rootes v Shelton,9 and followed in 
England and Wales in Condon v Basi.10 The defendant’s position on the other 
hand, was that the appropriate standard was that of reckless disregard, as 
held in Wooldridge v Sumner11 and Turcotte v Fell.12 
The court adopted the principles set out in Rootes v Shelton.13 Priestly J.A; 
expressly disregarded the judgment from Wooldridge v Sumner.14 He 
stated:15 
“For the appellant, it was contended that the duty 
should be stated in the way that he contended for 
on the basis of what was said by the English Court 
of Appeal in Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43. 
I do not think it is necessary to go into the detail of 
that case beyond mentioning that if it stood alone 
in this area of the law it would furnish a reasonable 
foothold for the legal contention of the appellant. It 
does not stand alone however. … After 
Wooldridge was decided, Professor Goodhart, in a 
comment in (1962) 78 Law Quarterly Rev 490 at 
496, said that the limitation by the Court of Appeal 
in Wooldridge of liability to recklessness 
introduced a novel element to negligence”. 
 
As far as the Frazer court was concerned, there was no doubt as to the 
appropriate standard of care to be applied. The position adopted was that a 
standard of ordinary negligence was appropriate to sports disputes. The court 
rejected the persuasive authority of Turcotte v Fell,16 despite the apparent 
similarity of facts with the case in hand. Priestly J.A., went on:17 
“Although this Court will give full consideration to 
common law judgments from outside Australia 
and Great Britain, where there is doubt about 
common law principles to be followed in a 
particular case, and although also valuable 
assistance is to be obtained from cases from 
other jurisdictions, that assistance is only 
available to this court as distinct from the High 
Court, in areas of law where this Court is in some 
real doubt about what the Australian position, as 
stated by the High Court, may be”. 
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The court, in reasoning as it did, and accepting ordinary negligence, 
categorically rejected the standard of reckless disregard. Priestley J.A., 
concluded:18 
“It seems to me that the kind of contention of the 
duty contended for by the appellant cannot be 
supported. Any formulation which involves an 
ingredient of recklessness or attempting to cause 
harm, seems to me to be inconsistent with the 
question the tribunal is bound to deal with in such 
cases, whether in all the circumstances in which 
he found himself, the defendant had done what 
was reasonable”. 
 
Of crucial importance to the court, was the inherent flexibility, (as they saw it), 
of the ordinary negligence standard which the court believed was sufficient to 
deal with disputes involving sports participants. Finlay J. stated, concerning 
the appropriate standard of care:19 
“So it becomes in the present case the 
reasonable man riding as a licensed jockey in a 
horse race. Those circumstances do not negate 
the duty on the part of the defendant to take 
reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of 
injury to the other jockeys, including the plaintiff. 
That single standard of care remains. But it does, 
shape what the reasonable response of a man in 
that situation would be. He is sitting astride a 
horse probably weighing between 1000 and 1200 
pounds and travelling up to forty miles per hour. 
In short, what is reasonable will vary with the 
circumstances in which the parties are involved”. 
 
In summarising his findings, Finlay J., held:20  
- The defendant caused his horse to cross dangerously close in front of the 
two horses immediately inside him, thereby severely compressing the 
horses further inside. 
- That a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would have foreseen 
the risk of injury to the horses and their riders. 
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- That the defendant was guilty of failing to take reasonable care for the 
safety of the plaintiff. 
- That the defendant’s actions constituted deliberately running an 
unjustifiable risk which constituted recklessness. (Although this 
finding was not required to establish liability) (Emphasis added) 
Although there was no real debate as to why this action was deemed to be 
reckless by the court, it is interesting to see a direct comparison, (in as much 
as the incidents were very similar) to the case from the USA,21 where the 
appropriate standard was that of reckless disregard, but the action was 
deemed not to breach that standard and the case from England and Wales,22 
which was argued under ordinary negligence principles, and where liability 
was also not found. 
The issue concerning the appropriate standard of care has been revisited 
several times in more recent years in Australia, with the same basic ruling as 
that seen in Johnston v Frazer23 resulting. In Hargreaves v Hancock,24 a case 
heard before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the circumstances 
were slightly different in that the event involved trotting horses and buggies, 
with a collision occurring between two leading horses. The circumstances, 
although involving some differences are clearly similar enough for the same 
broad principles to apply and indeed for the same broad rules of racing 
etiquette to also apply. In the case, Simpson J., in very clearly following the 
decision seen in Johnston v Frazer,25 ruled that,26 “The defendant clearly 
owed the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable care in the circumstances”. 
The defendant had already pleaded guilty to breaking Rule 265 of New South 
Wales Harness Racing, which stated:27 
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“Any driver who, in the opinion of the Stewards, 
caused or contributed to any crossing, jostling or 
interference by foul, careless or incompetent 
driving shall be deemed guilty of an offence 
against these Rules and may be dealt with 
accordingly”. 
 
The breaking of any rules of the activity in question of course is not 
necessarily indicative of negligence. It is merely one of the circumstances that 
will be considered by the court. Simpson J. explained the position:28 
“I do not regard the fact that the defendant was in 
breach of R265, or the fact that he pleaded guilty 
to the charge as conclusive of the issue I have to 
decide. The question is whether, on the facts as I 
have found them to be, the defendant was in 
breach of his duty to the plaintiff. I am satisfied 
that he was. I accept that the plaintiff participated 
in a sport which carries with it certain risks, and 
that the speed at which the sport is conducted 
increases those risks. Far from persuading me 
that the circumstance suggests that the 
defendant owes the plaintiff no duty of care or 
that it diminishes the extent of the duty, it 
persuades me more strongly that the defendant 
did owe the plaintiff a duty of care, and that what 
was encompassed in that duty is significantly 
greater than would have been the case in a sport 
carrying fewer, or lesser, risks”.  
 
If we consider that a sport carrying greater risks of injury inflicted by one 
participant on another should have a greater duty of care, then surely this 
could destroy the very nature of that sport. It is this concern that has proved 
crucial in leading most of the jurisdictions in the United States to adopt the 
standard of reckless disregard that Australia has rejected. Such a standard 
enables participants to compete on the edge of their sport, which, as 
illustrated very clearly by the defendant in Hargreaves v Hancock29 is for 
many the very essence of competitive sport:30 
“I am a driver that doesn’t give much room, that’s 
on the record. I drive very aggressively. I have 
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done all my life and the day I can’t be competitive 
in this field, in this dangerous sport we are in, I’ll 
hang up my whip”. 
 
The implications of this statement are clear – the defendant believes that he is 
justified in competing right to the very margins of acceptable conduct, almost 
heedless of the consequences for both himself and other competitors. A little 
bit of thought should establish that committed participation is desirable but 
that at times, competitive instincts must be reigned in, for the good of all 
participants. There is a world of difference between aggressive participation 
and assertive participation and it may well be the case that in this particular 
instance, the court decided that such a distinction needed to be illustrated – 
hence the resultant victory in the case for the claimant. It is difficult to assess 
whether the court had this in mind in reaching its decision; whether it was 
attempting to send a message to the wider trotting community that some 
restraint of behaviour is necessary on the racetrack, or whether the concerns 
were limited purely to this particular dispute. The potential dangers from 
trotting races persuaded this particular court that there was a higher duty to 
take care than there would be in a less exacting and dangerous activity. 
Simpson J. concluded:31 
“I am satisfied that the plaintiff participated in a 
sport which carries with it certain risks, and that 
the speed at which the sport is conducted 
increases those risks. Far from persuading me 
that circumstance suggests that the defendant 
owes the plaintiff no duty of care or that it 
diminishes the extent of the duty, it persuades 
me more strongly that the defendant did owe the 
plaintiff a duty of care, and that what was 
encompassed in that duty is significantly greater 
than would have been the case in a sport 
carrying fewer, or lesser, risks”. 
 
 8
The implication is stark, where a sport carries with it some danger, (typically a 
contact sport), there is a heightened standard of care imposed upon the 
participants. This lies in direct contradiction to the principles espoused in most 
jurisdictions in the United States. This kind of approach will lead to a greater 
sanitisation of sports, (particularly traditionally perceived dangerous sports), 
but those consequences may well destroy the very essence of such activities. 
Two recent decisions in Australia, both involving injuries received by jockeys 
during the course of horse races, have reaffirmed the standard of ordinary 
negligence in competitive sports in Australia. Both cases were heard in 
Queensland. The first, heard before the Supreme Court32, and the second 
before the District Court.33  
In Kliese v Pelling,34 the plaintiff was on board Walk Easy and the defendant 
on Cooper Queen. The incident, which led to the litigation, was described by 
Chesterman J. in the following way:35 
“About 200 metres from the finish-line, the 
defendant urged Cooper Queen off the fence in 
order to pass Piggy Miss on the outside. In 
attempting this manoeuvre Cooper Queen struck 
It’s Showtime moving that horse’s shoulders to 
the left which squeezed Walk Easy between it 
and Rocky Recalled. Caught between the other 
horses, Walk Easy tripped and went down, 
throwing the plaintiff onto the track”. 
 
The accident caused the plaintiff kidney injury and fractures and bone 
damage to a number of lumbar vertebrae, resulting in severe pain and 
discomfort. 
The first question that the court addressed concerned the applicable standard 
of care. On this question, Chesteman J., was quite categorical explaining 
further the authority on which he was basing his opinion. He stated:36 
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“Despite a flirtation by some cases in England 
with the concept of recklessness or intentionally 
caused harm as being necessary before an 
injured competitor may recover damages against 
a fellow competitor, the law in this country has 
remained constant to the notion that one owes 
one’s neighbours a duty to take reasonable care 
in the relevant circumstances. In the case of 
injury caused in a horse race, the test to 
determine whether a jockey was negligent in his 
riding is whether the jockey failed to take 
reasonable care for the safety of a fellow jockey 
in the circumstances”. 
 
Furthermore, the court stressed the need to retain reasonable care, at all 
times during the race, even in the very heat of competition during a driving 
close finish to a race. Chesterman J. continued:37 
“Racing is the sport of Lings (sic), not of 
savages. Endeavouring to win does not 
entitle a jockey to ignore the safety of fellow 
riders. The “conflicting responsibility”, though an 
important factor, does not require the court to 
disregard the other factors identified in 
determining whether there has been a breach of 
duty to take care (ie the magnitude of the ask 
[sic], the likelihood of its occurrence and the 
difficulty or inconvenience of avoiding it)”. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
An issue of real concern and importance in the finding of negligence was the 
failure of the defendant to look to his side to ensure there was adequate 
space to move into before adjusting his position. Chesterman J., explained:38 
“I am reinforced in this view by some evidence 
which was led in relation to what was called the 
“crossing rule”. The exact status of the rule was 
not made clear but the evidence did establish 
that the stewards required jockeys to have their 
horses one and a half lengths clear of another 
horse whose path was crossed or in front of 
which a horse took up running. … The 
importance of the rule is not that it seems to have 
been breached by the defendant because breach 
of the “rules” of a sport is an uncertain guide to 
negligence. See Rootes v Shelton at 385 per 
 10
Barwick CJ. The importance of the evidence is 
that it shows a recognition that before moving 
laterally on the race track (ie, left or right), a 
jockey was expected to ensure that, in so 
doing, he would not interfere with another 
horse. The requirement could not be satisfied 
unless the jockey first looked”. (Emphasis 
added) 
 
The defendant failed to ensure that he had clear space to move and as a 
result, liability was found. Whilst this may appear harsh and almost an 
application of strict liability, the finding can be justified as it is such a 
fundamental rule on the racetrack and no amount of reasons can possibly 
justify such an omission. If a standard of reckless disregard was applied in 
such a case then it is certainly more questionable as to whether liability would 
be held. Such a situation would do little for the general safety of jockeys and 
would encourage less care between participants on the racetrack. However, 
the finding of liability in this instance, based on a standard of ordinary 
negligence in no way threatens the nature of the sport. All jockeys know that 
they must look before moving – they knew this before the accident and that 
knowledge remains after the accident.  
In Flanders v Small,39 the salient facts were that the plaintiff’s horse, (Miracle 
Knight), clipped the heels of the defendant’s horse, (Campbell’s Kingdom), 
causing the plaintiff to fall from his horse resulting in serious injury. The 
defendant had already moved left once but had straightened his mount 
following a warning shout from the plaintiff. As McGill DCJ, explained:40 
“The defendant had reacted as if he was aware 
of the plaintiff’s position, and in those 
circumstances there was no particular reason for 
the plaintiff to be anticipating a further move to 
the left in the immediate future by Campbell’s 
Kingdom”. 
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Shortly afterwards however, this is precisely what happened. Campbell’s 
Kingdom was again prompted to move to his left by the defendant, without the 
defendant first checking that it was safe to move, causing the fateful collision. 
In addressing the issue of negligence, McGill DJC, commented:41 
“If the defendant was not aware that his first 
move had caused some difficulty to someone to 
his left rear, he ought to have been aware of that. 
I also find that the defendant did not in fact look 
or glance to his left just before moving out the 
second time. The defendant admitted as much in 
evidence. I also find the move to the left was 
deliberate. Whether Campbell’s Kingdom ended 
up moving further to the left than the defendant 
had intended is, in my opinion, irrelevant, since I 
think the operative negligence occurred at the 
point where Campbell’s Kingdom began to move 
to the left”. 
 
McGill DCJ, is clearly stating that the failure of the defendant to look before 
moving laterally was the fundamental factor in the finding of negligence, (it 
seems likely that the actions of this particular defendant may have been held 
to be sufficiently reckless for liability to attach even if that was the standard of 
care applied. The court was obviously of the opinion that the movement itself 
was deliberate and further that the previous movement which the court drew 
attention to should undoubtedly have alerted the defendant to the potential 
danger associated with his action). McGill DJC opined further:42 
“Whether or not, as a general proposition, a 
jockey is negligent if he or she moves to the left 
or right without first glancing in that direction to 
ensure that the move will not foul another horse, 
in my opinion it was negligent of the 
defendant to move his horse deliberately to 
the left to some extent on the second 
occasion, in circumstances where he knew 
that a similar move a couple of seconds 
earlier had apparently caused difficulty to a 
rider to his left rear, without first glancing to his 
 12
left to ensure that such a move would not cause 
a similar difficulty”. (Emphasis added) 
 
 
Caldwell v Maguire & Fitzgerald 
Peter Caldwell, (the claimant), suffered a broken back when his horse fell 
after contacting a leading horse that had been squeezed and checked by the 
horses of the two defendants. Both defendants were found guilty by the 
course stewards of careless riding. According to Rule 153 of the Rules of 
Racing promulgated by the Jockey Club,43 (in effect the governing body of all 
horse racing in the United Kingdom): 
“A rider is guilty of careless riding if he fails to take 
reasonable steps to avoid causing interference or 
causes interference by misjudgement, or 
intention”. 
 
Both defendants were subsequently banned from competitive racing for a 
period of 3 days, (the maximum allowed being a 14 day ban). 
Both parties provided testimony from illustrious expert witnesses from the 
world of racing. The experts, although disagreeing on some points, did concur 
on two very important ones. Holland J., reviews:44 
“In the event both Defendants had adopted 
courses that in conjunction served to deprive 
Royal Citizen, (the horse that actually brought 
down the claimant), of the inside line without there 
being that necessary clearance and accordingly 
both experts endorsed the finding of the Stewards 
that both defendants were guilty of careless riding 
as defined by the Rules. They advised that both 
Defendants should have checked by way of a 
glance to the left before regarding Royal Citizen as 
no longer in contention for the lead – not least 
because the earlier pattern had been for 
recovery of position between hurdles”. 
(Emphasis added) 
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The final part of this passage is a reference to the pattern of the race, which 
saw Royal Citizen falling back at the hurdles but then recovering between 
each hurdle to regain parity with the leader. 
Mr Justice Holland, in making his assessment of the appropriate standard of 
care, held:45 
“That duty is to exercise in the course of the 
contest all care that is objectively reasonable in the 
prevailing circumstances for the avoidance of 
injury to such fellow contestants. 
The prevailing circumstances are all such properly 
attendant upon the contest and include its object; 
the demands inevitably made upon its contestants; 
its inherent dangers (if any); its rules, conventions 
and customs; and the standards, skills and 
judgment reasonably to be expected of a 
contestant. Thus in the particular case of a horse 
race the prevailing circumstances will include the 
contestant’s obligation to ride a horse over a given 
course competing with the remaining contestants 
for the best possible placing, if not for a win. Such 
must further include the Rules of Racing and the 
standards, skills and judgment of a professional 
jockey, all as expected by fellow contestants”. 
 
In thus assessing the appropriate standard of care as ordinary negligence 
taking account of all the circumstances, Mr Justice Holland, then sought to 
describe the type of behaviour which may amount to a breach of that 
standard. He wrote:46 
“In practice it may therefore be difficult to prove 
any such breach of conduct that in point of fact 
amounts to reckless disregard for the fellow 
contestant’s safety. I emphasise the distinction 
between the expression of legal principle and the 
practicalities of the evidential burden”. 
 
The language used may echo that of Wooldridge v Sumner,47 and of cases in 
many American jurisdictions, but Holland J. was it seems at pains to 
emphasise the gulf between applying a standard of care predicated on 
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recklessness, and utilising an ordinary negligence standard with a description 
of recklessness as the kind of behaviour that would breach that standard. In 
assessing the situation in this way, Holland J., is to some extent loyal to the 
comments of Phillimore J., in Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard,48 who, whilst 
accepting the standard of care from Wooldridge v Sumner,49 (that of reckless 
disregard), nevertheless stated:50 
“It is, however important to remember that the test 
remains simply that of “negligence” and that 
whether or not the competitor was negligent must 
be viewed against all the circumstances – the tests 
mentioned in Wooldridge v Sumner are only to be 
applied if the circumstances warrant them”. 
  
Whilst apparently following precedent in announcing that the appropriate 
standard of care as ordinary negligence, it does appear to be unsatisfactory 
that Holland J., opined that only reckless or intentional behaviour would 
actually breach this standard. He seems, in fact, if not in form, to be applying 
just such a standard of reckless disregard but under the guise of ordinary 
negligence taking account of all the circumstances.  
 
Contradicting the Prevailing Standard 
Holland J., in his ruling in Caldwell, held that the defendants were guilty of 
lapses of care in their riding but that this did not constitute the recklessness or 
intention that in his mind was necessary to prove negligence. This however is 
not the approach that has been taken to participants in contact sports in 
English case law since Condon v Basi51 in the Court of Appeal and the source 
of Holland J’s reasoning is elusive. The standard of care since Condon v 
Basi52 has remained that of ordinary negligence, and not that of reckless or 
intentional action. Holland J. has apparently disregarded this standard in 
 15
favour of offering, via the imposition of a recklessness standard, almost total 
immunity from prosecution for sports participants involved in horse racing. 
Predictably, this judgment was met with approval by the racing fraternity. Mr 
Michael Caulfield, Chief Executive of the Jockeys’ Association commented:53 
“This is not a day for celebrations, because there 
is deep sympathy for Peter … but the implications 
for racing, and other sports where contact and 
injuries take place, were huge if the judgment had 
gone the other way”. 
 
Similarly, Alan Lee, (Racing correspondent for The Times), wrote on the 
subject:54 
“The essential fabric of racing, stitched together by 
an unspoken assumption of risk, was tested and 
reprieved by a High Court judge yesterday. In 
finding against a civil claim for negligence filed by 
one jockey against two others, Mr Justice Holland 
settled a landmark case in the only way that could 
protect racing from a breakdown of trust and 
constant recourse to law”. 
 
If this line is followed, then the implications for the jockey and it may be 
argued for any participant in a contact sport, are that in future it may be very 
difficult to obtain compensation for another’s negligence.  
It is ironic that in attempting to justify his dismissal of the claim, Holland J. 
cited Mr Justice Chesterman in the Australian case Kliese v Pelling,55 when 
he said: 
“Thoroughbred horse racing is a competitive 
business, which is played for high stakes. Its 
participants are large animals ridden by small men 
at high speed in close proximity. The opportunity 
for injury is abundant and the choices available to 
jockeys to avoid or reduce risk are limited. It is, no 
doubt, for these reasons that claims for damages 
arising out of horse races have been rare and are 
likely to remain so”. 
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However, later in the same passage, (not cited by Holland J.), Chesterman J. 
continued:56 
“But where evidence reveals that a rider has failed 
to take reasonable care which could and therefore 
should have been taken, the court is required by 
law to make a finding of negligence”. 
 
Judgment was found for the claimant in Kliese and he gained a total of 
A$91,996.25. In making his decision, Chesterman J. cited with approval the 
judgment of Kitto J. in Rootes v Shelton57 and it was this approach that was 
accepted unquestioningly in Condon v Basi58 that has now apparently been 
disregarded in Caldwell.59 
In three jurisdictions, we have three different approaches adopted with a 
combination of results. In the United States, (State of New York), a clear and 
categorical declaration of the standard of care to be applied – that of reckless 
conduct. The end result of the case, no liability found. In Australia on the other 
hand, there was a rejection of the American approach and a clear acceptance 
that the appropriate standard of care is that of ordinary negligence. The 
situation in England and Wales demonstrated in Caldwell60 however lacks the 
clarity of the jurisdictions in USA and Australia and consequently, it has led to 
an unsatisfactory result. The case has left the position related to contact 
sports in England and Wales shrouded in uncertainty. In one High Court 
judgment, (confirmed in the Court of Appeal), Mr Justice Holland has stripped 
away the relative clarity that had been present since Condon v Basi,61 and 
replaced it with an unsatisfactory compromise that is going to need further 
judicial intervention to settle the appropriate standard of care for sports in 
England and Wales. 
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Conclusions 
 
It is interesting to note that in most of the above-mentioned cases, a failure to 
look before moving was found to be of crucial importance in finding liability, 
this failure to look demonstrating a clear lack of reasonable care on the part of 
the defendants. However, in the English “jockey” case, Caldwell v Maguire 
and Fitzgerald,62 it was precisely this action, (or lack of action), that led to the 
collision which precipitated the case, but the Court of Appeal in England and 
Wales was unable to reach the same conclusion as the Australian Courts 
found. Judge L.J., stated:63 
“The defendants in this case were held by 
Holland J., after he had considered the evidence, 
to have made errors or lapses of judgment. What 
they failed to do was sufficiently allow for the 
presence of the horse ridden by Mr Byrne on 
their inside. … Their error in the heat and 
commitment of the race was to misjudge the 
exact opportunity that was available to them to 
take. They did not appreciate that Mr Byrne’s 
horse had not gone backwards as far as they 
thought it had. As they assumed that he was no 
longer in contention for the inside line, they did 
not physically look for him. Their assumption was 
wrong”. 
 
The defendants’ clear failure to look before they moved was undoubtedly the 
cause of this accident, just as it had been in Johnston v Frazer,64 Kliese v 
Pelling,65 and also in Flanders v Small,66 but there was no liability found, 
clearly lending weight to the suspicion amongst many that the standard of 
care being applied in English and Welsh Courts, is something different to that 
of the ordinary negligence standard being clearly applied in Australia. The 
question arises as to why it was held to be unreasonable to fail to look before 
moving in a race in Australia, but not in England and Wales.  
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When these cases are analysed, it can clearly be argued that, in England and 
Wales, while a standard of ordinary negligence in all the circumstances is 
applied explicitly, the conclusion may be drawn that it is in fact something 
rather different that is being implied. What makes the behaviour seen 
negligent in Australia, but not so in England and Wales? It can certainly be 
argued that if anything, the conduct of the jockeys was actually more 
blameworthy in Caldwell.67 Evidence showed that the defendants, based on 
the pattern exhibited in the race, had good reason to suspect that the claimant 
was close beside them, (as was the case in Flanders v Small,68 a factor of 
which that court was particularly scathing). In addition to that, the race in 
Caldwell was over jumps and therefore run at a slower pace than the races, 
which took place in Australia. That the incident took place well away from the 
fences also serves to discount the jumps as a possible distraction for the 
jockeys. It is reasonable to argue that there may not have been the same 
sense of the agony of the moment that there may otherwise have been had 
the event been over the flat and consequently run at a far greater speed. Both 
of these factors would seem to point towards a greater sense of culpability in 
Caldwell,69 yet it is in the Australian cases where liability was found. There 
seem to be no discernible reasons as to why there have been these different 
findings in what amounted to very similar cases. Each have authority 
stemming from the same case, (Rootes v Shelton70), each involved the same 
basic error of judgment by the defendants, (failure to look before moving their 
horse sideways) and each had the same consequential results. The culture 
involved in horseracing views the necessity of looking before moving as being 
absolutely essential. Such heedless movement is not something that jockeys 
 19
may be considered to consent to in their profession. Whenever a jockey is 
aware of a riderless horse around his or her own horse, they must be mindful 
of the possibility of erratic and sudden movement, (as was seen so graphically 
in the Grand National recently where such erratic movement caused the 
leading horse to refuse a fence). It is not something that they expect to 
happen when there is a jockey on board, despite the size, power and 
occasionally independent nature of the thoroughbred horse and yet the courts 
involved were unable to agree on this basic issue, failing to show a common 
understanding of the sport.  
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